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1.     Institutional reforms of network industries in Germany:
     A disaggregated approach
Network industries are typically characterised by different (sub)-parts which
strongly complement each other. A large spectrum of different historically
grown organisational and institutional structures can be observed, each solving
the relevant co-ordination problems in an institutionally different way. For ex-
ample, although airport owners, airline companies and air traffic control agen-
cies can only jointly guarantee well-functioning air traffic, they have been or-
ganisationally and institutionally separated ever since the beginning of commer-
cial air traffic. In contrast, it has only been in recent years that an increasing
trend towards vertical open network provision of railroad systems, telecommu-
nications networks and electricity systems can be observed. The traditional ver-
tically integrated railroad systems are gradually opening to allow access for al-
ternative service suppliers on European railroad networks. Moreover, a strong
tendency towards competition within telecommunications networks can be ob-
served, including service competition and competing network carriers.
In order to provide a differentiated picture of the institutional reforms in network
industries, it seems useful to differentiate between the following network levels.
Level 1: Network services (e.g. air traffic, railway traffic, truck transport,
shipping, production and resale of electricity or gas, telecommuni-
cations services).
Level 2: Infrastructure management (e.g. air traffic control, railway traffic
control).
Level 3: Network infrastructure (e.g. airports, railway infrastructure, trans-
portation and distribution networks of electricity or gas).
The term privatisation has been applied in different meanings. In the broadest
sense, privatisation refers to the introduction of market oriented institutional re-
forms. This includes the sale of publicly owned assets as well as the deregula-
tion of product markets. Privatisation played an important role during the transi-2
tion process of East Germany (e.g. Sinn, Sinn, 1991).
1 The focus of this paper,
however, is on network industries.
In this paper the role of liberalisation and privatisation
2 in German network in-
dustries is considered for each network level successively, with particular em-
phasis on the impact of these institutional reforms on the market performance of
network services. The topical question to what extent remaining sector specific
regulation is still necessary shifts the focus to the vertical problems of the re-
quired access of network services to infrastructure management and network
infrastructure. Remaining reform potentials therefore also include the vertical
perspective of non-discriminatory access to infrastructures complementary to the
network service level. However, this does not imply the necessity of an end-to-
end regulation.
2.      The liberalisation process of network services in Germany (level 1)
2.1    The EC initiatives
When the debate on the possibilities of privatisation and deregulation started in
the late 1970s and early 1980s, the primary focus was on the network service
level. Therefore this reform process has been strongly interrelated to the EC
policy of liberalising European service markets.
The debate on the deregulation of transport services in Europe was not only fo-
cussed on airlines, trucks and ships, but the role of (potential) entry on European
railway networks was also seriously considered. One precedent was set by Fos-
ter Yeoman, a stone-producer in the U.K., which in 1986 purchased its own
                                                
1  The agency which has been in charge of privatisation was the “Treuhandanstalt”. In
East Germany, 4.223 out of 12.036 key-sector enterprises were totally privatised
between 3 October 1990 and 31 July 1992; moreover, 3.981 parts of enterprises were
privatised with a minority participation of the “Treuhandanstalt” (Bös, 1993, p. 98).
2   In this paper the term privatisation is used in its most common sense as sale of pub-
licly owned assets (e.g. Kay, Thompson, 1986), in contrast to deregulation.3
American diesel locomotives from General Motors for its aggregates trains. In
1989 the EC Commissioner, Karel van Miert, argued in favour of private suppli-
ers of train services. In 1991, the Council of the European Community issued
regulation No. 1893/91 on the establishment of railway undertakings or railway
rolling stock undertakings in the EC, based on a proposal by the Commission of
the European Community.
A cornerstone for the take-off of the development towards competition in Euro-
pean telecommunications markets was the Commission of the European Com-
munities’ British Telecom decision in 1982 and its confirmation by the Euro-
pean Court of Justice in 1985. According to this decision, British Telecom
should no longer be permitted to forbid the high-speed forwarding of telex mes-
sages between foreign countries by competitive agencies in Great Britain. The
procedural setting of this case was most unusual because the Italian government
and not British Telecom appealed against the Commission’s decision. Moreover,
the British government intervened, taking sides not with the Italian government,
but with the Commission. The important message of the British Telecom case
was that the Commission of the European Community was able to apply the
Treaty of Rome’s competition rules to the European telecommunications ad-
ministration based on the public law of the different member countries.
3
Since then, the Commission has initiated a wide-ranging discussion of the possi-
bilities of completing the common internal market for telecommunications in the
European Community. Obviously, this effort was strongly related to the Com-
mission’s endeavour to complete the common market by 1992. The “Green Pa-
per on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Serv-
ices and Equipment” – issued by the Commission in June 1987
4 – proposed that
the provision of terminal equipment as well as enhanced telecommunications
services should be liberalised within and between the member countries.
5 Basic
                                                
3  For a detailed explanation of this case see Schulte-Braucks, 1986, pp. 202-215.
4  KOM (87) 290 fin.
5  In addition, the Commission pleaded for a liberalisation of the procurement policy of
the national telecommunications administration as well as for an introduction of
European-wide telecommunications standards.4
services (mainly voice telephony) as well as the largest parts of the physical
networks could still be monopolised by the national telecommunications ad-
ministrations;
6 however, arguments concerning the public interest of such a mo-
nopoly should periodically be investigated.
It is already well known from normative micro-economic theory as well as from
U.S. experience (e.g. Müller, Vogelsang, 1979; Windisch (ed.), 1987; Horn,
Knieps, Müller, 1988) that legal entry barriers, administrative price setting, pro-
hibition of cabotage etc. is nothing but a publicly sanctioned monopoly or cartel
agreement, and therefore counterproductive from the economic welfare point of
view.
Consequences of active and potential competition in the markets for network
services are the abolishment of monopoly rents with a subsequent reduction of
tariff levels, increasing incentives for cost efficiency, optimisation of service
networks, more rapid reaction of prices to changes in the costs and demand
structure, increasing price-quality options. From a normative point of view these
beneficial effects of entry deregulation and price liberalisation are not only to be
expected for the markets for network services in Germany, but also for all other
countries liberalising network services.
Nevertheless, the reform process of liberalising network services was strongly
path-dependent. Compared to the U.S. deregulation and U.K. privatisation
movements in the 1980s the respective developments in Germany have been
quite inconspicuous. Several reasons may be mentioned. Among other things,
there is the long tradition of “Gemeinwirtschaftslehre”, favouring regulation and
public enterprises, and the institutionalised role of trade unions opposing privati-
sation and deregulation (Vogelsang, 1988, pp. 195f.). After all, the liberalisation
process took nearly two decades, until 1998. In fact, the provision of letter serv-
ices is still monopolised and the provision of local public transport cannot seri-
ously be called competitive.
                                                
6  Only the margins of the physical networks (mobile radio and low speed satellite
communication) were opened for competition.5
2.2    Liberalisation of different network service markets in Germany
2.2.1 Transportation  markets
Tariffs for truck transport in Germany have been liberalised since January
1994,
7 but it was only after 1998 that entry restrictions by licenses and cabotage
prohibitions completely disappeared. The tariffs of the German shipping market
were also liberalised in January 1994. Entry and exit were traditionally liberal
for ships under German flag, and cabotage prohibition for foreign ships have
been gradually liberalised since 1993.
The European airline market was liberalised by the so called three liberalisation
packages in 1987, 1990, and 1992, gradually liberalising airline tariffs and mar-
ket entry for international flights. In accordance with EU liberalisation policy,
the German airline market has been liberalised since 1998. Whereas navigation
and truck transport services were always provided by private firms, the German
national airline company Lufthansa was completely privatised in 1994. Entry
deregulation of the airline market, however, was not combined with non-
discriminatory access rules to airports. In 1993 the EU adopted the IATA guide-
lines under Council Regulation No. 95/93, based on the grandfather rights of
incumbent airlines.
As regards the railway sector, on January 1, 1994, the „Bahnstrukturreform“
(railway reform) was enacted, based on the report of the „Regierungskommis-
sion Bundesbahn“, which was appointed by the government in 1989 (e.g. Ewers,
1994; Boss, Laaser, Schatz et al., 1996; Knieps, 1996). The transition from a
public enterprise to a firm under private law in the form of a joint stock com-
pany can only be considered a formal privatisation (rather than a real privatisa-
tion by sale of publicly owned assets), because the state is still the sole owner of
the Deutsche Bahn AG. Separate branches for infrastructure, commodity trans-
portation, passenger long-distance transportation and passenger local transporta-
tion have been established. The Deutsche Bundesbahn and the Deutsche
                                                
7  Tarifaufhebungsgesetz vom 13. August 1993.6
Reichsbahn, its counterpart in East Germany, suffered from large amounts of
debt. The first step of the privatisation process thus consisted of the relief of the
liquidation of debts and the endowment with new capital. A major goal of pri-
vatisation was entry deregulation of train services in the context of the liberali-
sation of European transport markets. Accounting separation between service
level and infrastructure level was considered a necessary precondition.
2.2.2  The German telecommunications reform
The first step of the German telecommunications reform was taken with a new
law passed on July 1, 1989,
8 restructuring the traditional Deutsche Bundespost
(DBP) into three independent enterprises: postal services, telecommunications
services and financial services (Postbank), which were then privatised. For tele-
communications, the public enterprise DBP Telekom was transformed into the
privatised Deutsche Telekom AG in 1995. Although the state still holds about
43 % of the shares, privatisation can be considered to be not only a formal one,
because a significant part of the shares are traded at the stock exchanges.
Moreover, the government has no golden shares, aiming to ensure that ordinary
residential telephone service would continue to be made available as widely as
before privatisation.
9
Privatisation of the former Deutsche Bundespost was accompanied by entry de-
regulation in two steps. Under the strong influence of the Commission’s “Green
Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications
Services and Equipment”
10 of June 1987 partial entry deregulation was intro-
duced in European countries. There were controversial debates on the costs and
benefits of global entry deregulation. The obstacles to comprehensive entry de-
                                                
8  Gesetz zur Neustrukturierung des Post- und Fernmeldewesens und der Deutschen
Bundespost (Poststrukturgesetz) vom 8. Juni 1989, Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I vom 14.
Juni 1989, pp. 1026-1051.
9  Such golden shares called “Kiwi Shares” were introduced for example during the
privatisation process in New Zealand (e.g. Ergas, 1996). 
10  KOM (87) 290 fin.7
regulation did not, however, exclude the possibility of partial entry deregulation.
Partial deregulation included free entry into terminal equipment supply and into
value added network services (VANS) on the basis of the physical network pro-
vided by the network monopolist.
The “Green Paper on the Liberalisation of Telecommunications Infrastructure
and Cable Television Networks” issued by the Commission in October 1994
11
again strongly influenced the process of liberalisation of European telecommu-
nications. The “Full Competition Directive”
12 of 13 March 1996 demanded that
member countries permit free entry into all parts of telecommunications. The
new telecommunications laws allowing overall market entry were enacted by the
national parliaments during 1996, coming fully into effect on 1 January 1998.
2.2.3  The reform of the German electricity market
The liberalisation of European electricity markets is based on the EU directive
concerning a common electricity market of February 1997 (Directive 96/92/EC),
setting a two year target for implementation into national legislation. Germany
implemented the directive in April 1998 with the modified Energy Act (Ener-
giewirtschaftsgesetz, EnWG). The aim is to achieve competition at the genera-
tion stage as well as at the retail stage. Before that, the electricity sector had
been characterised by fully integrated monopolies stabilised by an exemption
from the general prohibition on cartels. The supra-regional electricity networks
are mainly in private ownership.
13 On the local / regional level active participa-
tion of municipalities can be observed.
 14
                                                
11  KOM (94) 440 fin.
12  Commission Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC
with regard to the implementation of full competition in the telecommunications
markets, OJ L 74, 22. 3. 1996, p. 13 (the “Full Competition Directive”).
13  Private shareholders (including institutional shareholders like insurance companies)
hold 67 % of the shares and municipals hold 33 % of the shares
  of RWE AG (cf.
RWE, 2003, p. 182). 
14  Details on the German electricity sector can be found in Brunekreeft, Keller, 2000,
p. 16 and Brunekreeft, 2003, p. 135.8
In contrast to the other European countries, in Germany privately negotiated
frameworks (“association agreements”) arranging the conditions for network
access have been applied. However, implementing the amendment of the EU
directive, which entered into force in July 2003 as directive 2003/54/EC, the re-
vision of the German energy law is currently in its final stage, introducing sec-
tor-specific ex ante regulation and extending the competency of what is at pres-
ent the regulatory agency for telecommunications and postal services.
15
2.3   The impact of the liberalisation of transportation services on market
 performance
An early survey of the impact of the liberalisation of services in different net-
work industries was provided by a study of the Kiel Institute for World Eco-
nomics in 1996 (Boss et al., 1996). This study demonstrates that the gradual
opening of the network service markets has already had a positive impact on the
performance of markets for network services. Significant price reductions due to
tariff flexibility could be observed in German inland shipping, whereas entry has
always been free (Boss et al., 1996, p. 58). After entry deregulation of truck
transport prices decreased, service quality increased, and industry efficiency im-
proved. Large price reductions due to tariff liberalisation could be observed in
truck transport; during the first year after liberalisation prices already decreased
on average by 24% below the lower tariff borderline of the former regulated
long-distance transport tariff (Boss et al., 1996, table 1, p. 97). It has been esti-
mated that in Germany – prior to liberalisation – regulation accounted for excess
costs of 30 to 40 % for long-distance truck transport. Increasing competition
promoted innovation and encouraged firms to improve their services and de-
velop a wide range of specialised transport services (Boylaud, Nicoletti, 2001, p.
241).
                                                
15  Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neufassung des Energiewirtschaftsrechts (27. Februar
2004). The future regulatory agency will be called „Regulierungsbehörde für Elek-
trizität, Gas, Telekommunikation und Post (REGTP).9
Entry of new airlines to service national lines in Germany started gradually in
1988 (Aero Loyd, Germanwings) and has increased since 1991 (Boss et al.,
1996, p. 153). Since the European Single Aviation market in 1997 airline tariffs
for international flights within Europe are no longer governed by the price cartel
of the IATA-Airlines.
16 According to an OECD study there is clear evidence that
overall efficiency and the rate of occupancy of aircraft seats tend to increase and
average fares tend to decrease due to competition; however, only if constraints
on airport access are relaxed can the simultaneous liberalisation of the domestic
/ regional market and international (long-distance) routes result in full network
optimisation and cost efficiency (Gönenç, Nicoletti, 2001, p. 216).
17
As a consequence of airline deregulation in Germany product differentiation in-
creased, a large number of different tariffs were established and the application
of yield management was increased. The growing importance of yield manage-
ment can be illustrated by the pricing strategies of low cost carriers, such as Ry-
anair, Germania, Germanwings, Hapag-Lloyd and others (e.g. Klophaus, 2003;
Schleusener, 2003). The pricing strategies of these newcomers are heterogene-
ous (see Schleusener, 2003, p. 25). Product differentiation is also strongly de-
pendent on the type of airport the airlines serve. Ryanair, for example, is con-
centrating on regional airports with a consequent focus on tourists with high
price sensitivity, but low time preference. This group of customers is also will-
ing to accept long travel distances to the airport. In contrast, for example Ger-
mania is focussing on price sensitive business customers. As a consequence,
Germania serves national and international airports; for example, flights are of-
fered between Frankfurt International Airport and Berlin Tegel. On this route,
Germania is competing directly with the traditional incumbent Lufthansa as the
Bundeskartellamt’s recent competition decisions on predatory pricing demon-
strate.
18
                                                
16 The bulk of international routes outside Europe is still governed by restrictive bilat-
eral air service agreements (ASA’s) (e.g. Gönenç, Nicoletti, 2001, pp. 188, 221).
17 The problem of non-discriminatory access to airport slots will be considered in sec-
tion 3.
18  Bundeskartellamt, 9. Beschlusskammer, B9 – 144/01, 18. Februar 2002. In this con-
text the role of reallocation of scarce airport slots and the subsequent challenge of10
Active competition on the German railroad market is focussed on commodity
transportation within Germany as well as local passenger transportation. Entry
into cross-border transportation can rarely be observed; cabotage on foreign
networks within other EU countries does not exist. Competitive subscriptions
for subsidies for local passenger transportation take place only to a limited ex-
tent (e.g. Aberle, Eisenkopf, 2002, pp. 68 f.).
2.4     The impact of the liberalisation of the telecommunications markets on
performance
The partial deregulation of the telecommunications sector
19 already resulted in
free entry into terminal equipment supply and value-added network services,
employing the physical network of the DBP Telecom monopoly. Moreover, in
addition to DBP Telecom two alternative mobile communications providers
were licensed. Although the voice telephony market was still monopolised, long
distance tariffs were falling by about 20 % during the period 1996-1998. Be-
tween 1989 and 1994 tariffs for households had already been decreasing by 9.3
% (Boss et al. 1996, pp. 194f.). This already indicates not only the technological
process in the telecommunications sector, but also the increasing instability of
partial entry deregulation. Due to the tendency to mix voice and data communi-
cations services it became increasingly difficult to differentiate between legally
protected voice telephone services and competitive value-added network serv-
ices (e.g. Knieps, 1989, pp.179f.).
 Since the complete entry deregulation of the telecommunications market in 1998
massive private investments in alternative long distance infrastructures have
been undertaken and in this area there is now both active and potential competi-
tion. At present there are a large number of competitors with their own country-
wide long distance networks in Germany. Although the markets for long dis-
                                                                                                                                                        
“grandfathering” could be observed (Bundeskartellamt, 9. Beschlusskammer, B9 –
62100 – Z –75/02, 7. August 2002) (see section 3) .
19 Voice telephony which accounts for ca. 85 % of total returns as well as network
infrastructure remained monopolised until January 1998.11
tance telecommunications services are still frequently characterised by econo-
mies of scale and economies of  scope, there is nevertheless active and potential
competition.
20 Since overall free entry became possible, the performance of the
German long distance telecommunications market has improved strongly: this
includes a large number of service providers, providing an increasing scope of
services, entry of several network carriers, strongly decreasing prices for long
distance calls etc. (cf. Gabelmann, Groß, 2003, pp. 110-121; Stumpf, Schwarz-
Schilling, 1999; Immenga et al., 2001, pp. 8-14; Brunekreeft, Groß, 2000;
Monopolkommission, 2001, p. 52 ).
 
 The price level for long distance voice telephony decreased substantially during
the first years of the global entry deregulation. The development of the price in-
dex for long distance services that is reported by Statistisches Bundesamt 1999
and that enters the consumers price index in Germany fell by 41.7 % between
February 1998 and April 1999. A more differentiated view is provided by
figure 1.
 
 After global entry deregulation three types of providers of long distance voice
services emerged. The traditional incumbent Deutsche Telekom, alternative
network providers (“nationale Vollsortimenter”), which invested heavily in in-
frastructure, and switch based service providers, which hardly invested in infra-
structure. During the competition process differences in the price setting behav-
iour of the different types of firms could be observed. The intense price compe-
tition in the winter of 1998/99 not only reduced the overall level of prices, it also
resulted in a convergence of prices. The internet and printed media were full of
price information, agencies also provided information and the providers them-
selves advertised aggressively with price as the decisive variable in long dis-
tance telecommunications (Brunekreeft, Groß, 2000, p. 932).
                                                
20  The required non-discriminatory access to the complementary local networks,
including number portability, has been granted by sector specific regulation.12
Figure 1:  Average prices for the three types of providers
Source: Gabelmann, Groß (2003), p. 116
 
 The overall development can be summarised as follows (Brunekreeft, Groß,
2000, p. 932): Deutsche Telekom lowered its average price by 62 %, the alter-
native network operators by 66 % and the service providers by 52 % between
February 1998 and April 1999. In April 1999 the service providers charged on
average only 32 % of what consumers had had to pay to Deutsche Telekom for
comparable services 16 months earlier.
 
 After the initial period of strong price decline during 1998/99 the price level be-
gan to stabilise. The price for foreign calls was still 36.5 % lower in 2001, as
compared to 2000, and then became stable. In contrast, prices for local access
and local calls remained stable (Monopolkommission, 2001, p. 52).
21
                                                
21   See Statistisches Bundesamt, Verbraucherpreisindex für Telekommunikations-
dienstleistungen, Mitteilung Nr. 41 vom 31. Januar 2001.
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 The strong decline of prices for long distance voice telephone services in Ger-
many since global entry deregulation is summarised in figure 2. These price de-
velopments are by no means unique; similar developments can be observed in
other European countries.
 
Figure 2:  Minimal tariffs for national long distance calls in fixed networks
(date: 9 January 2003)
Standard tariffs, discounts excluded
Prices in cent per minute, weekdays, call-by-call
Source:  Jahresbericht 2002, Marktbeobachtungsdaten der Regulierungsbe-
hörde für Telekommunikation und Post, p. 23
 
Whereas Deutsche Telekom held 100% of the market share for voice telephony
before global entry deregulation, the market share of the competitors strongly
increased during the period of competition. The competitors’ market share
(share of traffic volume in minutes) for national long distance calls, including
regional calls, increased from 10.3 % in 1998 to 34.7 % in 2001; the market
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share for international calls increased from 20 % in 1998 to 51 % in 2001
(Monopolkommission, 2001, p. 45).
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2.5  The impact of the liberalisation of the electricity retail services on
market performance
The deregulation of the electricity market focussed strongly on the role of retail
competition. In contrast to most other EU countries Germany opted for complete
eligibility from the beginning of liberalisation in April 1998. The development
of retail competition focussing on the large group of small domestic and com-
mercial end-users is indicated in figure 3.
23
 
 
 
 Figure 3:  Development of electricity prices for residential users
(with an annual consumption of 3.500 kWh)
Source:   Brunekreeft, 2003, p. 220, based upon Brunekreeft, Keller, 2000, p. 23
                                                
22  At that time no preselection and call-by-call were available for local calls.
23  For detailed analysis see Brunekreeft, Keller (2000), pp. 22f. and Brunekreeft (2003)
pp. 218f.
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The price developments are divided into incumbents‘ prices (owner of the dis-
tribution network) and entrants‘ prices (owner of distribution networks in other
areas or pure retailer). Around August 1999 retail competition started reducing
the price level significantly. The lowest price level was reached in the spring of
2000. Incumbents reacted immediately. However, since then entrants have left
the market or increased their prices. As a consequence, prices went up continu-
ously (Brunekreeft, 2003, pp. 219f.). These developments are shown in figure 4.
Figure 4:   Price development in German electricity retail markets
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Source:   Eurostat, several years
 The price developments until the summer of 2000 were considered as an indica-
tion of the success of the liberalisation of German electricity markets. The large
scale entry of large retail companies (e.g. Yello) and the subsequent price drop
attracted substantial attention in the media. After entrants increasingly left the
retail markets and prices increased again, public attention shifted to the role of
access to electricity networks. In particular, the complaint was that due to exces-
sive access charges the price levels of competitive retailers did not guarantee
market survival (Brunekreeft, 2003, p. 219).
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2.6    The provision of universal services
The objective of universal service provision by means of subsidisation has been
of no relevance for the provision of truck transport services or shipping; fur-
thermore it was of minor interest for airline transportation markets. However,
subsidisation of telecommunications, postal services (especially first class mail),
train services (in particular local traffic) as well as public transport (ÖPNV) is
still politically relevant.
The major reason why global entry deregulation – including voice telephone
services as well as network infrastructure – was only introduced in 1998 (nearly
twenty years after the slow beginning of deregulation in the early 1980s) was the
provision of universal services at socially desired tariffs by means of cross-
subsidisation.
In the German telecommunications sector the political process was dominated
by a silent coalition between the Deutsche Bundespost (DBP) and its unions on
the one hand and the small and peripheral users on the other hand. The DBP and
its unions were interested in the monopoly which in turn could only be legiti-
mised and supported politically by the subsidies it provided for the large major-
ity of small and peripheral users at the expense of business users.
Some way had to be found to compensate small and peripheral users for the
losses they would incur in the case of complete entry deregulation. Only such an
arrangement could secure their support on the issue of telecommunications de-
regulation. In order to make free entry into all parts of telecommunications po-
litically acceptable, it was proposed to split the silent coalition between the tele-
communications administration and the small users by setting up a universal
service fund (Blankart, Knieps, 1989). The purpose of this fund was to keep the
traditional subsidy of the small users stable, only changing the way it was fi-
nanced from internal to external subsidisation. In order to make sure that the
small users do not oppose deregulation it seems to be important to guarantee the
price-level of the traditionally internally subsidised services as upper boundary
(“social contract” pricing).17
Under a universal service fund every chosen supplier of a subsidised service has
the right to obtain an external subsidy, financed out of this fund. The amount of
subsidy depends on the difference between the incremental costs of providing
the socially desired services and the “social-contract” prices. The competition
for subsidies also reveals the actual burden of the universal services and the
minimum costs of traditionally internally subsidised services. It cannot be ex-
pected that the traditional carrier is necessarily the most cost-effective supplier,
if new firms with cost-saving technologies (e.g. mobile telephone and micro-
wave systems) enter the market. Therefore, the bidding for the subsidised mar-
kets may strongly reduce the volume of subsidies required. In particular, an in-
crease of the universal service fund to finance the traditionally internally subsi-
dised services can be excluded as long as the scope of universal services is not
extended (Blankart, Knieps, 1989).
One possibility of financing the required subsidies would be the public budget.
This is still the case in public transport; for telecommunications and postal
services, however, the concept of an entry tax has been proposed, which all sup-
pliers of lucrative activities (incumbent and competitors) would have to pay. The
concept of a universal service fund was introduced in the new German Tele-
communications law enacted in 1996 (as well as in many other European coun-
tries). The concept was also introduced in the new postal law.
Until now, no universal service fund has been implemented in Germany. In
contrast, in the U.S. a universal service fund was established. The size of this
universal service fund became rather large, because not only the traditional
cross-subsidised narrow-band services in rural areas, but also cost-intensive new
services, including broad-band internet access for schools and libraries as well
as health care providers were included (CC Docket No. 96-45, In the Matter of
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, May 8, 1997, in particular pp.
227, 318; April 10, 1998).  Contributions to the federal universal service support
mechanisms are determined using a quarterly contribution factor calculated by
the Federal Communications Commission. For example, projected program sup-
port for the fourth quarter 2003 was 1.599725 billion $ (schools and libraries:
0.551197 billion $), which was related to total projected collected interstate and18
international end-user telecommunications revenues of 18.607282 billion $ for
the fourth quarter 2003, resulting in a proposed contribution factor of 0.092
(Universal Service Contribution Factor, CC Docket No. 96-45, September 5,
2003)
The instrument of a competitive bidding procedure for subsidised public trans-
portation services (transparent and non-discriminatory subscription procedures)
was implemented legally during the reform of the railway services. Today the
implementation of the “Bestellerprinzip” focussing on ex ante bidding for subsi-
dies from the public budget, instead of ex post, ad hoc subsidy requirements is
the leading concept in EU transportation policy (although its implementation in
practice does not always seem to be an easy task).
3.      Reform of infrastructure management (level 2)
The importance of co-ordination and allocation activities of network capacities
varies strongly between different network industries. Although the liberalisation
of the network services increases co-ordination efforts, truck transport and ship-
ping has rarely been co-ordinated in the past, but the current implementation of
toll collect in Germany for heavy trucks shows the increasing importance of in-
frastructure management for road traffic also.
In contrast, air traffic control has a long tradition in infrastructure management.
It is well-known that air transport services not only require airports and planes,
but also air traffic control systems. Air traffic control systems not only have the
task to guarantee traffic safety, but are also responsible for an efficient alloca-
tion of airspace capacity. Although airport owners, airlines and air traffic control
agencies can only jointly guarantee a well-functioning air traffic, they are or-
ganisationally and institutionally separated.
The permanent control and co-ordination of traffic is also necessary for train
services. Train control systems are therefore the decisive link between rails and
stations on the one hand and the supply of train services on the other hand. This19
co-ordination effort depends on the number of trains, the sequencing of faster
and slower trains as well as their speed, but is not influenced by the number of
train companies that are active on a certain railroad network. Moreover, the cost
of train control does not increase when train control systems are organisationally
separated from the tracks. The scheduling and operating of trains as well as the
repair of rails has to be co-ordinated by train control systems, irrespective of
whether they are vertically integrated with the tracks and station infrastructure
or not. Recent technological developments in advanced train control systems
and high-speed computers have provided ample opportunities to automate many
functions in scheduling and operating railroads. Thus, train traffic control sys-
tems are developing towards highly software-oriented technical systems with a
large potential of transborder-oriented scale. Similar to air traffic control, possi-
bilities arise for an integrated Europe-wide train traffic control system, harmo-
nising train schedules and co-ordinating train movements on a Europe-wide
scale. Compared with the current train co-ordination policy, which is strongly
geared to the national or regional levels, large efficiency benefits can be ex-
pected.
The strong national orientation of the capacity management of track capacities
was caused by the traditional national railroad monopolies. Transborder orienta-
tion within the international union of railways (UIC) has been minimised with
respect to standardisation (e.g. Knieps, 1995). Therefore, optimisation is
strongly limited to national railroad systems. A long-term objective could be the
founding of a European train traffic control agency responsible for the co-
ordination of Europe-wide train services. Such a development could be strongly
stimulated by separating train control from national rail infrastructure policies.
Although air traffic control in Europe is much more integrated than train traffic
control, the allocation of airspace is in the competence of the individual coun-
tries. Eurocontrol has no final authority, its board, the permanent commission, is
composed of the transport ministers of the member countries. National bounda-
ries and the objective of retaining the sovereignty of the individual countries
have led to arbitrary inefficient horizontal divisions. According to a study by
Eurocontrol  (2002, p. 35) cost of delays, due to air traffic flow management, are20
estimated to be between 2500 to 3600 million € (total airspace user costs and
cost of passengers). In the meantime, reform proposals by the European Com-
mission are focussing on the creation of a single European upper airspace by
merging the current national regions (European Commission, 2002, p. 9).
In Germany, formal privatisation of the air traffic control organisation into
Deutsche Flugsicherungs GmbH /DFS took place in January 1993. The cost of
this organisation has to be covered (similarly to Eurocontrol) by user charges.
The efficiency effects of formal privatisation are not known (e.g. Boss et al.,
1996, p. 174). Whereas until the year 2000 the revenues were sufficient to cover
costs, in the years 2001 and 2002 a deficit of 33.380 million € and 21.466 mil-
lion €, respectively, occured (Deutsche Flugsicherung, 2003, p. 2).
Since traffic control systems are natural monopolies, which need public author-
ity to define the scope and borderlines of the control areas, selective free entry
into the control business is not feasible and would lead to disaster. Nevertheless,
competitive bidding to find the most efficient traffic control agency for a well
defined control area can be expected to work.
24 If bidding took place Europe-
wide, a process of competition among institutions would occur. As a conse-
quence, the agency with the most innovative software and control system might
also be successful in providing traffic control services in other countries.
Since the liberalisation of the electricity sector the co-ordination between elec-
tricity generation and transmission has become increasingly important.
25 In the
meantime, in continental Europe transborder high-voltage transportation by
means of transborder interconnectors as well as the evolution of markets for bal-
ancing power („Regelenergie“) have become major issues. Due to the important
role of system externalities (based on Kirchhoff’s laws, which state that it is the
characteristic of electricity to seek the path of least resistance) there seems to be
a large co-ordination potential of transborder electricity flows between European
                                                
24  Network specific market power due to the absence of significant sunk cost cannot be
expected (see also next section).
25  For the experience of co-ordination in the electricity pool of England and Wales see
e.g. Brunekreeft, 1997.21
countries, which until now seems rather unexploited (e.g. Zimmer, 2004). Co-
ordination efforts also play a role in telecommunications, e.g. standardisation,
telephone numbering, and spectrum allocation. Such efforts to define and allo-
cate property rights should, however, be differentiated from permanent control
and the co-ordination of traffic flows.
4.      Reforms of allocation of network infrastructure capacities (level 3)
The more the aim of liberalising network services succeeded (entry deregula-
tion, price deregulation etc.), the more did the focus of EC directives as well as
the national sector-specific laws shift to the problems of access to network infra-
structure.
4.1    The reform process
In Germany the new telecommunications law, together with a decree on special
access, was passed in 1996. This new telecommunications law is currently under
review, focussing on the scope of future regulation as well as the adequate
regulatory instruments (e.g. Vogelsang, 2003). The new German energy law was
passed in 1998. In contrast to all other European countries German legislation
opted for allowing negotiated third party access within the association agree-
ments for network access. A revision of this law is now in its final stage intro-
ducing regulated third party access. The German railroad reform of 1993 is cur-
rently also under review focussing on the introduction of sector specific access
regulation. Grandfather rights to airport slots are also under attack in the context
of the current review of the EU Council Regulation No. 95/93 on allocation of
airport slots from 1993, which at that time did not allow market-based instru-
ments such as slot exchange and slot auction (e.g. Boyfield, 2003, p. 34).
In contrast to the provision of network services state ownership on the infra-
structure level still plays an important role in Germany. Highways are owned by
the state, German railways are only formally privatised. Airports are to a large22
extent owned by the state, but increasingly private capital is attracted. Since
1997 the heavily used (congested) airports Düsseldorf and Frankfurt, and subse-
quently Hamburg and Hannover have been partly privatised („Teilpriva-
tisierung“) (e.g. Brunekreeft, Neuscheler, 2003, p. 260).
26 Since private capital
can only be raised if risk-equivalent interest rates can be expected, privatisation
shifted public attention to the cost covering possibilities of access charges to the
infrastructure.
Infrastructure of telecommunications networks is mainly owned by private firms
(although the state still owns a large part of the shares of Deutsche Telekom).
Private shares have a strong tradition in electricity and gas networks. The long
distance networks for gas transportation are owned by private firms. On the lo-
cal / regional level, however, this picture changes due to the active participation
of municipalities.
Vertical separation in terms of ownership between the different network levels
did not occur in German network industries, irrespective of the ownership
structure (private or public), before the liberalisation process started. However,
in the railroad sector there has been an intense controversy on the issue of sepa-
rating railway infrastructure from railway services and not only formally priva-
tising the service companies of the Deutsche Bahn AG (e.g. Knieps, 1996, p. 44;
Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Verkehr, 1997, p. 632).
This, nevertheless, did not succeed so far.
4.2   Remaining  reform  potentials
The reform potentials on the level of network infrastructure and the remaining
regulatory problems centre around the basic question whether the providers of
network services need access to a network infrastructure with characteristics of a
monopolistic bottleneck (e.g. Knieps, 1997, p. 327). Remaining reform poten-
tials therefore centre around the vertical perspective of non-discriminatory ac-
cess to infrastructures complementary to the network service level. However,
                                                
26  The share of private capital in Düsseldorf is 50 %, in Frankfurt 28.97 %, in Hamburg
36 % and in Hannover 30 % (Gerber, 2002, p. 31).23
this does not imply the necessity of an end-to-end regulation including the com-
petitive segments.
The conditions necessary for a monopolistic bottleneck facility are fulfilled
(1)   if a facility is essential in order to reach customers, i.e. if there is no second
or third such facility, in other words if no active substitute is available. This
is the case if, due to bundling advantages, there is a natural monopoly
situation, meaning that one supplier can make the facility available more
cost-efficiently than several suppliers;
(2)   and if at the same time the facility cannot be duplicated on reasonable eco-
nomic terms, i.e. if there is no potential substitute available. This is the case
if the facility's costs are irreversible and if, as a result, there is no function-
ing second hand market for these facilities.
The criterion for the localisation of the remaining sector-specific need for regu-
lation within network infrastructures is always the question whether access to
these facilities is an indispensable prerequisite for offering a complementary
service at an upstream or downstream production level. It is therefore necessary
to ensure non-discriminatory access to the bottleneck through tailor-made bot-
tleneck regulation. In all other network areas, however, the situation is com-
pletely different because there is active and potential competition.
The bottleneck theory is not a theory developed specifically for a single network
sector. Whereas there are no monopolistic bottlenecks on the level of network
services and infrastructure management, monopolistic bottlenecks do exist on
the infrastructure level. Examples are: airports, railway infrastructure, electricity
transmission and distribution networks. Nevertheless, not every network infra-
structure does possess the characteristics of a natural monopoly in combination
with irreversible costs. For example, supra-regional high-pressure gas pipeline
transmission in Germany is not a monopolistic bottleneck, due to the broad
competition potential created by pipelines operated by project companies,
through ownership in undivided shares and through access options to competing
backbone pipelines (Knieps, 2002). Long-distance telecommunications networks24
are characterised by the existence of alternative network providers and the re-
maining bottleneck problem is limited to the local loop (e.g. Knieps, 1997, pp.
331f.; Laffont, Tirole, 2000, p. 98). Compared to other European countries (e.g.
Switzerland, Great Britain) in Germany developments of inter-active cable TV
networks are still at an early stage. A major reason for this slow development
can be found in the institutional separation of the vertical industry structure, in
particular the separation between the local access points and the subsequent in-
house provisions (e.g. Distelkamp, 2000, p. 4).
Competitive network infrastructures do not create regulatory problems. Due to
network alternatives the problem of avoiding discriminatory access disappears;
incentives do exist for efficient allocation of network capacities; excessive prof-
its cannot be expected; and the subsidy problem disappears.
Regulating those parts of network infrastructures characterised as monopolistic
bottlenecks remains an important task even after full market opening. Where
network sectors have monopolistic bottleneck areas, they need specific regula-
tion to discipline remaining market power. This requires, above all, symmetric
access to the monopolistic bottleneck areas for all active and potential providers
of network services to allow (active and potential) competition to fully develop.
Moreover, price cap regulation should be applied, limited to the monopolistic
bottleneck areas.
There are still network infrastructures remaining where access charges do not
allow cost covering. The provision of infrastructure investments in streets, ca-
nals, airports, and rails has traditionally been considered a typical task of the
state. As long as the usage of the infrastructure is so low that there is non-
rivalry, market prices do not make sense and the state plays a significant role in
guaranteeing its finance. The introduction of time- and capacity-dependent
landing fees or railroad access charges significantly improves the financing of
the infrastructure costs. Nevertheless, it seems important that public subsidies to
guarantee cost cover requirements of infrastructures with low demand (“Infra-
strukturvorhaltefunktion”) should only be granted as a result of a transparent
political process.25
5.   Conclusions
When the debate on the possibilities of privatisation and liberalisation started in
the late 1970s and early 1980s, the primary focus was on the network service
level. Therefore this reform process has been strongly interrelated to the EC
policy of liberalising European service markets. Nevertheless, the reform proc-
ess of liberalising network services was strongly path-dependent. After all, the
liberalisation process took nearly two decades.
The gradual opening of the network service markets has already had a positive
impact on the performance of markets for network services. Significant price
reductions due to tariff flexibility could be observed in German inland naviga-
tion, whereas entry has always been free. Large price reductions due to tariff
liberalisation could be observed in truck transport. After entry, deregulation
prices decreased, service quality increased, and industry efficiency improved.
Increasing competition promoted innovation and encouraged firms to improve
their services and develop a wide range of specialised transport services. As a
consequence of airline deregulation in Germany product differentiation in-
creased, a large number of different tariffs were established and the application
of yield management was increased. The price level for long distance voice te-
lephony decreased substantially during the first years of global entry deregula-
tion. After the initial period of strong price decline during 1998/99 the price
level began to stabilise.
The more the aim of liberalising network services succeeded (entry deregula-
tion, price deregulation etc.), the more did the focus of EC directives as well as
the national sector-specific laws shift to the problems of infrastructure manage-
ment and access to network infrastructure, and in particular to the future role of
sector-specific regulation of the remaining network-specific market power.
Therefore, it seems useful to differentiate between network services, infrastruc-
ture management, and the (non-competitive) monopolistic bottleneck areas of
the network infrastructure.26
Since the complete entry deregulation of the telecommunications market in 1998
massive private investments in alternative long distance infrastructures have
been undertaken and in this area there is now both active and potential competi-
tion. In contrast, airports and railway infrastructures are monopolistic bottle-
necks, with the need for adequate access regulation. In the meantime there is an
intense debate on introducing a market for slots, focussing on non-
discriminatory and efficient allocation of airport capacities. Ex ante regulation
of non-discriminatory access to railway infrastructures is currently under review
and should lead to improved competition on markets for railway traffic. In addi-
tion, the current reform proposals by the European Commission are focussing on
the harmonisation and integration of infrastructure management, in order to
overcome the strong national orientation of the infrastructure management.
These efforts are also intended to contribute to increased efficiency on the Euro-
pean transportation markets.
Electricity transmission networks are also monopolistic bottlenecks, without ac-
tive and potential competition on the level of infrastructure. The deregulation of
the electricity market focussed strongly on the role of retail competition but ig-
nored the role of access regulation to ensure this competition. The comparison
of retail prices of incumbent firms and market entrants as well as the market exit
of the new competitors has been a result of this shortfall. Currently, with the in-
stallation of a regulatory authority, public attention shifts to the future role of
access regulation of electricity networks.
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